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The interaction between age and culture can have various implications for cognition as
age represents the effect of biological processes whereas culture represents the effect
of sustaining experiences. Nevertheless, their interaction has rarely been examined.
Thus, based on the fact that Asians are more intuitive in reasoning than Americans, we
examined how this cultural difference might interact with age. Young and old participants
from the US and Singapore performed a categorization task (living vs. non-living). To
measure their reliance on intuition, we manipulated the typicality of targets (animate vs.
inanimate). We showed that (1) RTs for inanimate organisms were slower than RTs for
animate organisms (atypicality cost), (2) the cost was particularly large for older adults
and (3) an age × culture interaction was observed such that cultural differences in the
cost (Singaporeans > Americans) was found only among older participants. Further, we
demonstrated that the age effect was associated with cognitive function and the culture
effect among older adults was associated with cultural values. Finally, a moderated
mediation analysis suggests that cognitive function and cultural values interact with each
other in order to jointly influence one’s cognition.
Keywords: aged, culture, cognitive style, categorization, cultural differences
WHEN AGE AND CULTURE INTERACT IN COGNITION: A CASE
OF CATEGORIZATION
As early as James (1890/1950), psychologists have investigated individual variations in cognition.
Two important sources of differences in cognition are age and culture, each of which has been
closely investigated. With increased age, adults show decreased performance in many cognitive
domains, including processing speed, working memory, long-term memory, and reasoning;
although measures of general knowledge are shown to be age-invariant (Park et al., 1996; Park
and Gutchess, 2002). With respect to culture, a large number of studies have also demonstrated
considerable cross-cultural differences in cognition (Nisbett et al., 2001). Westerners (e.g., North
Americans and Western Europeans) tend to be analytic in their reasoning – focusing on a salient
object, separating it from the context, and basing their reasoning on logical rules, whereas East
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Asians (e.g., Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese) tend to be holistic –
broadly attending to the entire context and basing their reasoning
on experiential knowledge (e.g., intuition). Although aging
and cultural influences on cognition have both been well-
documented, there has been surprisingly little investigation of
their interactions (see Park and Gutchess, 2002 or Chua et al.,
2006 for notable exceptions). Therefore, the present research
attempted to examine how age and culture combine to jointly
influence our cognition.
Age, Culture, and Cognition
So how might age and culture come together to determine one’s
cognition? Park et al. (1999) suggest that in cases where age
and culture interact, the form of the interaction will depend
on the nature of a task. First, if performance on a culturally
sensitive task relies primarily on cultural knowledge (as opposed
to cognitive resources), cultural effects on cognition may be well-
maintained through late adulthood, since acquired knowledge
(e.g., vocabulary) is less likely to show typical age-related declines
(Park et al., 1996). Consistent with this notion, recent research
has found that both younger and old participants in Japan
and the US showed comparably sized cultural differences on
cognitive tasks which are sensitive to cultural experiences but not
necessarily demanding of cognitive resources (Kitayama et al.,
2013, unpublished). For example, they examined participants’
preferences for analytic vs. holistic reasoning (e.g., taxonomic
vs. thematic categorization). That is, the tasks used in their
research measured cognitive styles (i.e., preferences shaped by
cultural knowledge) rather than cognitive abilities and, in these
tasks, comparable cultural differences were maintained across
the lifespan. Notably, they found that one’s responses in these
tasks were not associated with basic cognitive functions such as
processing speed. In this sense, these tasks can be said to be
relatively insensitive to cognitive resources.
However, Park et al. (1999) also suggest that the interaction
between age and culture may take a different form. Specifically,
they predicted that cultural differences would be minimized
with age due to the strong and universal effects of age-related
decline on the task (“biological leveling”), if a task where cultural
differences are observed in young is demanding of cognitive
resources such as working memory and processing speed. In line
with this proposition, Hedden et al. (2002) examined both speed
and working memory and reported the evidence of biological
leveling –that is, culture effects decreased with age. More
specifically, Chinese young adults outperformed American young
adults in numerically based tasks, namely the digit comparison as
a processing speed task and the digit span as a working memory
task. The differences were due to the fact that Chinese syllables for
numbers impose a lower processing load than American syllables
for numbers (Cheung and Kemper, 1993). More importantly,
however, these cultural differences were not observed between
Chinese and American older adults (over 60).
It is noteworthy that the nature of a given task is largely
determined by the way it is set up. For example, an attribution
task can be made up mainly as a cognitive style measure (i.e., low
sensitivity to cognitive resources) by investigating one’s relative
preference between dispositional and situational explanations
without any clear indication that one is more accurate than
the other. Or alternatively, an attribution task can be presented
in a resource-dependent way (i.e., high sensitivity to cognitive
resources) by measuring one’s ability to overcome cultural bias
toward dispositional or situational explanations when one is
clearly more accurate than the other. In other words, cultural
differences in attribution typically found among young adults
may or may not be observed among older adults depending on
how a given attribution task is set up.
To sum up, previous literature has identified two different
forms of the age × culture interaction: (1) no interaction with
age (i.e., cultural differences in cognition are held across the
lifespan) occurs when the focus is on cognitive styles (e.g.,
Kitayama et al., 2012, unpublished) and (2) a convergent pattern
(i.e., cultural differences in cognition decrease as a function
of age) occurs when a given task is sensitive to cognitive
resources and age-related declines dilute cultural differences
among older adults (e.g., Hedden et al., 2002). Building
on the literature, we propose that the interaction between
age and culture may take yet another form. Specifically, we
predicted that cultural differences in cognition could diverge
with aging (i.e., cultural differences in cognition could be
larger among older adults than among younger adults). We
further argue that this type of interaction between age and
culture should occur when a culturally sensitive task makes
relatively low demands on cognition. In this case, young adults
from the two cultures might have sufficient cognitive resources
to overcome biases that their cultural mode of reasoning
may produce, but older adults would not, resulting in the
interaction.
For example, if East Asian/holistic reasoning leads to
better performance in a given task than American/analytic
reasoning, American participants may face cultural disadvantages
in performing the task. However, if the task is easy, young
Americans would be able to overcome any cultural disadvantage
that the task may impose, since they have sufficient resources
to mitigate such disadvantage. In that case, cultural differences
between young Americans and East Asians would be small
at best. In contrast, however, older Americans may not be
able to overcome cultural disadvantages due to the decline
in cognitive resources, which would lead to greater cultural
differences between older Americans and East Asians. Note that
cultural psychologists have thus far been more interested in
cognitive style than cognitive performance and hence, in most
tasks they have designed, cognitive load or task difficulty is
not directly relevant to the magnitude of cultural differences.
Following this logic, the present research investigated whether
the predicted pattern of the age × culture interaction (i.e.,
divergence with aging between cultures) would occur when a
given task is sensitive to both cultural experiences/cognitive style
and cognitive resources/cognitive performance but at the same
time, when the cognitive load for the task is low for younger
adults.
Two separate lines of research provide initial support for
this predicted form of the age × culture interaction. The first
line of work that is relevant to the present analysis comes from
a literature of cultural differences in the correspondence bias
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(i.e., biased toward dispositional attribution in social perception).
This literature examines the moderation effect of cognitive
load on the magnitude of cultural differences. For example,
the correspondence bias was much more pronounced among
Westerners than East Asians (Choi et al., 1999) and moreover,
Knowles et al. (2001) found that such cultural differences in
correspondence bias was magnified by cognitive load since it
is cognitively demanding for Americans to take into account
situational constraints. Similarly, old Americans showed the
largest correspondence bias (Blanchard-Fields et al., 2007). These
finding clearly demonstrates that cognitive load interacts with
cultural style of reasoning and that age-related declines can be
a critical factor in cultural differences in cognition. Secondly,
another relevant line of findings was reported in the literature
on cognitive aging (Gutchess et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2013).
For example, Gutchess et al. (2006) showed that East Asians
organized knowledge based on taxonomic categories less than
did Americans and further, this tendency was particularly
evident among older East Asians presumably because of age-
related declines in cognitive resources. Their findings are highly
consistent with ours. Building on their findings, the present work
directly measured cognitive function and investigated whether
cognitive function would interact with culture in a way that we
predicted.
Present Research
In order to investigate the hypothesized form of the age× culture
interaction, we studied the typicality effect in category
judgments – a reasoning task which shows robust cultural
differences and also relies on cognitive resources. The typicality
effect occurs when people project unknown features from a
superordinate category (e.g., bird) to subordinate categories (e.g.,
eagle or penguin) more easily for typical members as opposed
to atypical members (Sloman, 1993). For example, given that all
birds have ulnar arteries, people thought it was more likely that
all eagles have ulnar arteries than that all penguins have ulnar
arteries because an eagle is more typical than a penguin as a
member of the bird category. Importantly, the typicality effect is
shown to be sensitive to cultural influences (Norenzayan et al.,
2002). They found that East Asian culture promotes intuitive
reasoning and consequently, East Asians are more susceptible
to the typicality effect than Americans. The effect can be also
resource-sensitive, as one is required to inhibit an intuitive
judgment (based on typicality) and apply logical rules. Hence,
we hypothesized that older adults might be more disrupted by
the typicality effect than younger adults, since older adults have
difficulties in inhibition across various domains (Hasher and
Zacks, 1988; Spieler et al., 1996). Taken together, the typicality
effect can be sensitive to both aging and cultural influences and
provides a rare opportunity to test the age × culture interaction.
Therefore, in the present work, we recruited both young and
old participants in the US and Singapore and had them make
category judgments (i.e., whether a target belongs to the category
of living organisms) for either typical targets (living and animate)
or atypical targets (living and yet inanimate). Moreover, it is
important to note that this type of category judgments is a simple
semantic judgment and its cognitive loads are likely to be low
for younger adults. Thus, we expected that both age-related
cognitive decline and cultural modes of reasoning might reveal
the predicted pattern of the age× culture interaction.
In addition, we expected that cultural difference in category
judgment would be closely linked to cultural values, since we
reasoned that those who endorsed East Asian cultural values
would also show East Asian reasoning (i.e., being intuitive).
Furthermore, we predicted that the association between cultural
values and reasoning would be moderated by cognitive function.
That is, a person who highly endorses values in East Asian culture
would be more likely to adopt intuitive reasoning and thus, to
be particularly vulnerable for the typicality effect. However, such
links between cultural values and reasoning would be attenuated
if he or she had enough cognitive resources to overcome the
bias resulting from the intuitive reasoning. In order to test
this moderated mediation model, we also measured participants’
cognitive function and value endorsement.
In sum, the present research investigated the interaction
between aging and culture in the domain of categorization.
Given that aging and culture are, respectively, neurobiological
and experiential processes, the present investigation could
demonstrate the dynamic interplay between neurobiological
decline (aging) and experiential factors (culture).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred and five Americans (US) and 98 Chinese
Singaporeans (SG) participated in the study. Younger US
(N = 51) and SG (N = 49) participants were college students.
Older participants in both cultures (US: N = 54 and SG: N = 49)
were recruited via community organizations and advertisements.
All participants were screened for psychological and physical
health. Specifically, volunteers were excluded if there was (1)
evidence of psychiatric illness within the past 2 years, including
substance abuse, (2) a history of recreational drug use in the
previous 6 months, (3) less than 10 years of education, (4) less
than 20/30 vision after correction, and (5) a history of CNS
disease or brain injury. Also, those who scored lower than 26
on the Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975)
were excluded. Therefore, it can be said that our participants were
physically and psychologically healthy.
Procedures
Category Judgment
Participants were presented with 64 English-word stimuli1 and
instructed to indicate whether or not each stimulus was a living
organism by pressing a designated key. Each word was displayed
1It may be argued that using English is problematic because of potential differences
in English fluency between young and old Singaporeans. However, English is
the official language in Singapore and thus, both young and old Singaporeans
were fluent in English. For example, old Singaporeans performed as well as old
Americans in our cognitive function tasks although they were tested with English.
Further, we predicted that old Singaporeans would be slower for the atypical trials
than for the typical trials and yet, there is no reason to believe that English fluency
would be particularly problematic for the atypical trials. All in all, English fluency
is not an issue in interpreting the results in the present research.
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for 3 s followed by a 500 ms fixation. Half of words were non-
living objects, whereas the others were living objects. Among the
32 living objects, six atypical targets were embedded and these
items were the focus of the present study (see the Appendix
for details). The items were atypical in that they were living but
inanimate organisms (e.g., seaweed) and were contrasted with
typical items that were living and animate (e.g., bear). Given
that East Asians are culturally encouraged to be intuitive, we
reasoned that the atypical trials would pose a bigger problem for
Singaporeans than to Americans. However, young Singaporeans
would be able to successfully address such cultural disadvantage
since the task would be fairly easy for them and thus, they
would have enough cognitive resources to overcome it. Therefore,
we predicted the age × culture interaction such that cultural
differences would be minimal among young participants but
evident among older participants. To ensure that cognitive loads
for the task were low, we did not include any ambiguous items.
Cognitive Function
In order to characterize age and cultural differences in cognitive
function, we included two processing-speed tasks (i.e., Pattern
and Dot Matching tasks), a reasoning task (the Cattell Culture-
Fair task; Cattell, 1949), and two memory tasks (i.e., Spatial
Span and Word) (see Chee et al., 2010 for details). To create
a summary index for cognitive function, we ran a principle
component analysis (PCA) on the measures of speed, working
memory, and reasoning that comprised the cognitive battery.
The PCA yielded two components. Since the first component
accounted for 53% of variances and all the measures were well-
loaded on it (0.63 < all loadings < 0.80), the factor scores of
the first component was used as a proxy for cognitive ability
(note that the second component accounted for only 15% of the
variance).
Cultural Values
To characterize cultural differences in values, we administered
the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). Since we
reasoned that those who endorsed East Asian cultural values
would also show East Asian reasoning (i.e., being intuitive), we
focused on one higher-order value type that we believe to be
highly endorsed in East Asia, namely conservation (a set of
values justifying the belief that people are truly embedded in
their groups; Schwartz, 1999). Consistent with this reasoning,
previous study showed that conservation was more endorsed by
East Asian cultures such as China and Korea than by English-
speaking cultures such as American and Canada (Schwartz,
1999). Conservation consists of three value types, Tradition,
Conformity, and Security (Schwartz, 1994). In the SVS, there
are 14 items measuring these 3 value types, Tradition (5 item
such as Humble and Moderate), Conformity (4 items such as
Honoring Parents and Elders and Obedient), and Security (5
items such as Social Order and Sense of Belonging). Participants
reported personal importance of each item on a 9-point scale (−1:
Opposite of what I value to 7: Extremely Important). In our data,
the reliability of conservation was acceptable in both cultures (US:
α = 0.81 and SG:α = 0.86). Thus, the index of conservation was
created by averaging them.
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Demographic Information
Demographic variables such as age and gender did not vary
significantly across two cultures except for education years. A 2
(Age: Young vs. Old) × 2 (Culture: SG vs. US) ANOVA on
education years revealed a main effect of culture (US > SG),
F(1,199) = 21.10, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10. Moreover, this culture
effect was qualified by a significant Age × Culture interaction,
F(1,199) = 16.55, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.08, such that old Americans
(M = 15.46) were more educated than old Singaporeans
(M = 12.74), t(101) = 5.26, p < 0.001, d = 1.05, while there
was no difference between young Americans (M = 14.52) and
young Singaporeans (14.33). Also, the main effect of age was not
significant. Taken together, participants from each culture were
comparable in terms of demographic variables except that older
American participants were better educated than old Singaporean
participants (see Table 1 for detailed information). The difference
in education years may be critical because education could
influence their performance in the category judgment task
and thus, education years were included in the main analyses
(reported below) as a covariate. This issue is further addressed
in the discussion section.
Cognitive Function
A 2 (age) × 2 (culture) ANCOVA on the index with education
years as a covariate revealed that first, there was no cultural
difference in cognitive function, F < 1; second, older participants
scored lower than younger participants, F(1,198) = 303.64,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.61 and finally, the age effect was not qualified
by culture, F < 1, US: Ms = 0.79 (Young) vs. −0.68 (Old),
t(103) = 11.97, p < 0.001, d = 2.36, and SG: Ms = 0.80
(Young) vs. −0.82 (Old), t(96) = 12.84, p < 0.001, d = 2.62.
In other words, in terms of cognitive function, there was
no cultural difference and age-related cognitive declines were
comparable across two cultural groups. Also, note that educations
years did not have significant impact on cognitive function,
F(1,198)= 1.09, p= 0.299, η2p = 0.005.
Cultural Values
A 2 (age) × 2 (culture) ACNOVA on the index of conservation
with education years as a covariate found a main effect of age
(Old > Young), F(1,198) = 59.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23, and a
main effect of culture, F(1, 198) = 62.53, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.24.
TABLE 1 | Demographic information.
US Singapore
Young (51) Old (54) Young (49) Old (49)
Gender M: 26 F: 25 M: 25 F: 29 M: 25 F: 24 M:24 F: 25
Mean age 22.03 66.61 24.22 65.96
Age range 20–29 61–78 20–30 61–76
MMSE 29.08 (1.01) 28.28 (1.18) 29.38 (0.92) 28.30 (1.16)
Education years 14.52 (1.83) 15.46 (2.58) 14.33 (1.52) 12.74 (2.66)
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Also, the interaction between age and culture was not significant,
F < 1. Thus, confirming our prediction, Singaporean were higher
on conservation than Americans both for younger participants:
SG= 19.48 vs. US= 15.54, t(98)= 6.00, p< 0.001, d = 1.21 and
for older participants: SG = 23.33 vs. US = 19.17, t(101) = 5.96,
p < 0.001, d = 1.19. We also note that cultural values did not
significantly vary as a function of education years, F < 1.
Category Judgment2
Accuracy
As the first step in the analysis of the category judgment data, we
conducted a 2 (Age: Young vs. Old) × 2 (Culture: SG vs. US) ×
2 (Type: Animate vs. Inanimate) mixed ANCOVA on the overall
accuracy with type as a within-subject factor and education years
as a covariate. The ANCOVA did not find any significant effect.
That is, the overall accuracy did not vary as a function of trial
type, age and culture. Rather, there was a high rate of accuracy,
ranging from 0.96 to 0.99 among the four groups. In other words,
a ceiling effect was observed, which confirms our expectation
that the category judgment task would be easy enough for all
the participants. More importantly, this result allowed us to test
our critical prediction, whether cultural differences would be
significant for older adults yet negligible for younger participants
when a given task is easy.
Reaction Time
We predicted that Singaporeans would show larger typicality
effects (slower RT for inanimate than for animate organisms)
than Americans and yet, these cultural differences would be
less (or not) evident for younger participant than for older
participants. In order to test the prediction, we conducted a 2
(Age: Young vs. Old) × 2 (Culture: SG vs. US) × 2 (Type:
Animate vs. Inanimate) mixed ANCOVA on the reaction times
(RTs) data with type as a within-subject factor and education
years as a covariate. The critical test of our prediction is whether
the three-way interaction would turn out to be significant in this
mixed ANCOVA. Confirming our prediction, the results showed
the significant three-way interaction, F(1,198) = 4.93, p = 0.028,
η2p = 0.024. We also note that education years again did not show
any significant effect3.
In order to further explore the three-way interaction effect,
we conducted a 2 (Culture: SG vs. US) × 2 (Type: Animate vs.
Inanimate) mixed ACNOVA on RTs for each age group. Among
older participants, as shown in Figure 1A, the ANOVA found
a main effect of Culture–older Singaporeans were slower than
older Americans, F(1, 100) = 14.32, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.13. More
importantly, the Culture × Type interaction was significant,
F(1, 100) = 9.11, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.084. It occurred because
the difference between Singaporeans and Americans were
significantly larger for inanimate organisms (RTs: 1400.73 vs.
2Mean RTs were used but median RTs also produced the same pattern of results.
Also note that mean RTs were calculated for correct responses and outliers within
each participant (mean± 2.5 SD) were excluded.
3In addition to the three-way interaction effect, other effects (main effects of age
and culture as well as age× type, age× culture interaction effects) were significant,
all Fs > 4.70, all ps < 0.05. The nature of these effects were revealed and discussed
in the following analyses.
FIGURE 1 | Mean RTs in the category judgment task by culture: (A) old
and (B) young participants.
1195.73 ms, t(101) = 4.37, p < 0.001, d = 0.86) than for animate
organisms (RTs: 1138.91 vs. 1011.01 ms, t(101)= 3.65, p< 0.001,
d = 0.73). In other words, the predicted cultural differences in
the typicality effect were confirmed. In contrast, among younger
participants, a 2 (Culture) × 2 (Type) ANCOVA only found
a main effect of Type (RTs: inanimate > animate organisms)
F(1,97) = 7.60, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.073. That is, for both young
Singaporeans and Americans showed the typicality effect to
a similar degree, RTs (ms): 1027.95 vs. 919.93, t(48) = 6.19,
p < 0.001 for Singaporeans and 1071.27 vs. 952.79, t(50) = 5.64,
p< 0.0014 .
Another way to look at the three-way interaction is conducting
a 2 (Age) × 2 (Type) ANCOVA within each culture. These
ANCOVAs revealed a significant Age × Type interaction effect
for both Singaporeans, F(1,95) = 22.41, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19,
and Americans, F(1,103) = 3.75, p = 0.056, η2p = 0.04. This
suggests that the typicality effect was larger for older participants
4It may seem odd that we did not find any cultural difference among younger
participants. In fact, this may be inconsistent with the previous study (e.g.,
Norenzayan et al., 2002) reporting cultural difference in categorization. However,
even in the previous study, cultural difference was found when the task was framed
as a similarity judgment, but not when the task was framed as a classification
judgment (e.g., Study 2 in Norenzayan et al., 2002; see also Gutchess et al., 2006).
Thus, when a categorization task is introduced as a formal test with correct answers
(as in our study), it is not uncommon to fail to find cultural difference among
younger adults who are taught formal logic (e.g., college students).
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than for younger participants in both cultures. However, as
indicated in the significant three-way interaction effect of the
overall ANCOVA, the age-related difference in the typicality
effect was more pronounced among Singaporeans than among
Americans.
Taken together, a series of ANCOVA analyses on RTs
showed the predicted pattern of the Age × Culture interaction.
Consistent with our prediction, cultural differences were
negligible among younger participants but were revealed in older
participants. We argued that this occurred because (1) our task
was a performance measure, favoring Americans and yet, (2)
it was a simple semantic judgment and hence, its cognitive
loads were low, especially for younger participants (for example,
the overall accuracy ranged from 0.96 to 0.99 among the four
groups). We believe that this allowed young Singaporeans to
overcome cultural disadvantages.
Cognitive Function and Cultural Values
In order to investigate a possible mechanism underlying the
cultural differences in the previous section, we conducted a
moderated mediation analysis using the Process macro (Hayes,
2013). First, we reasoned that the typicality effect was stronger for
Singaporeans than for Americans because Singaporean endorsed
East Asian culture and hence, intuitive reasoning. In other
words, cultural differences in the typicality effect would be
mediated by participants’ endorsement of East Asian culture,
as measured by cultural values. However, this mediation effect
would be moderated by cognitive function as those with enough
cognitive resources (e.g., young Singaporeans) should overcome
the disadvantage of cultural reasoning (i.e., intuitive reasoning).
This implies a moderated mediation model depicted in Figure 2
(Model 14). To test this model, the cost of atypicality (the relative
cost of inanimate organisms in RTs) was calculated by subtracting
RTs for animate organisms from RTs for inanimate organisms.
Then, this atypicality cost was used as a dependent variable in the
moderated mediation model. In the model, culture was used as
the independent variable (Singaporeans = −1; Americans = 1),
cultural values (i.e., conservation) as the mediator, and cognitive
function as the moderator of the cultural value (i.e., mediator) to
the atypicality cost (i.e., DV). Education years were also included
as a covariate. Since it is critical to our prediction to compare
participants with good cognitive function and those with poor
cognitive function, we estimated the conditional indirect effect
at one standard deviation above and below the mean of cognitive
function.
The analyses reported in Tables 2,3 supported our hypothesis.
First, as shown in Table 2, culture significantly predicted one’s
endorsement of conservation (the mediator model) and also,
one’s endorsement of conservation interacted with cognitive
function to predict the typicality cost (the DV model). More
importantly, the conditional indirect effects in Table 3 showed
that the indirect effect of culture on the atypicality cost through
one’s endorsement of conservation was significant for those with
poor cognitive function (i.e., −1 SD), as indicated in the CI that
did not include zero. In contrast, the CI for the indirect effect
included zero and hence, was not significant for those with good
cognitive function (i.e.,+1 SD). As inferred in this patter, the 95%
confidence interval of the index of moderated mediation (Hayes,
2015) did not include zero suggesting significant moderated
mediation, Index=−9.59, SE= 5.37, 95% CI [−22.03,−0.34]. In
other words, Singaporeans with poor cognitive function suffered
more from the typicality effects than Americans because of
their endorsement of East Asian culture whereas Singaporeans
with good cognitive function could overcome disadvantage
of East Asian cultural reasoning. This is consistent with our
interpretation of the age × culture interaction on the typicality
(i.e., only older participants showed cultural differences because
of their relatively poor cognitive function).
Alternative Explanations
Next, we addressed a couple of alternative explanations for our
findings. First, one may suspect that differences in cognitive
function are associated with cultural differences in the typicality
effects we found among older participants. However, among
older participants, cognitive function did not vary across cultures,
β = −11, p > 0.20 and also, cultural differences remained
FIGURE 2 | Moderated mediation. One’s endorsement of culture interacts with cognitive function to predict his or her performance in the category judgment task.
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TABLE 2 | Regression coefficients in the moderated mediation model.
Model B SE β t p
Mediator model (Mediator = Conservation)
Constant 0.29 0.40 0.72 0.472
Culture 0.46 0.06 0.46 7.33 0.000
Education years −0.019 0.03 −0.69 0.492
DV model (DV = Atypicality cost)
Constant 102.44 69.48 1.47 0.142
Culture 7.01 12.92 0.54 0.588
Conservation 25.89 13.91 1.86 0.064
Cdognitive function −43.75 12.43 −3.52 0.001
Conservation × Cognitive function −21.58 10.86 −1.99 0.048
Education years 3.95 4.76 0.82 0.408
Note that Conservation and Cognitive function were standardized.
TABLE 3 | Conditional indirect effect at one standard deviation below and
above the mean of cognitive function.
Cognitive function Effect SE 95% CI
−1 SD 21.11 8.78 [6.52, 41.45]
+1 SD 1.92 7.27 [−12.30, 16.79]
significant even when controlling for cognitive function, β= 0.21,
p = 0.04. Instead, our data suggest that the cultural difference in
category judgment among older adults was mediated by cultural
values. Specifically, culture significantly predicted cultural values
(conservation), β = 0.51, p < 0.001 (SG→ more endorsement
of East Asian values), and cultural values, in turn, predicted
the atypicality cost, even after controlling for culture, β = 0.21,
p = 0.07. Furthermore, when controlling for cultural values, the
culture effect on the cost decreased from β = 0.22, p = 0.02 to
β = 0.12, ns. Moreover, the Sobel test showed that the mediating
effect of cultural values was marginally significant, Z = 1.77,
p= 0.08 (Figure 3A).
Second, some may argue that age differences in the typicality
effect are closely linked to conservation (i.e., East Asian values)
as opposed to cognitive function because conservation would be
more endorsed by older participants than by younger participants
in general. Since there was no Age × Culture interaction on
cognitive function, we collapsed the data across cultures and
tested this idea. Contrary to the argument that the age differences
in the typicality effect might be driven by conservation, the
age effect on the atypicality cost remained significant even after
controlling for conservation, β = 0.25, p = 0.001, although
conservation was associated with the atypicality cost, β = 0.28,
p < 0.001. Instead, cognitive function significantly predicted
the atypicality cost in RT after controlling for age, β = −0.21,
p = 0.045 (less cognitive ability → more cost). Moreover, as
predicted, there was no effect of age on the atypicality cost after
controlling for cognitive function, β= 0.16, ns. Finally, the Sobel
test showed that the mediating effect of cognitive function was
significant, Z= 1.95, p= 0.05 (Figure 3B). Thus, as predicted, the
age difference in category judgment was mediated by cognitive
function.
Taken together, a series of mediation analyses shows that
aging and culture both play an important role in cognition and
yet, different processes underlie the effects (cognitive function
for the age effect and cultural values for the culture effect).
More importantly, as the moderated mediation analysis suggests,
cognitive function and cultural values interacted in the predicted
way, such that a participant’s endorsement of culture mattered
only for those with poor cognitive function when dealing with
a relatively easy task. However, we note that cross-sectional
mediation analyses should be interpreted with greater caution
than longitudinal data (Spencer et al., 2005; Bullock et al., 2010),
especially with respect to aging (Lindenberger et al., 2011).
Despite this limitation, the present data suggested that age and
culture can interact with each other to jointly influence one’s
reasoning.
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, the present research is a rare examination of
the age × culture interaction in cognition, demonstrating that a
reasoning task is jointly affected both by cultural knowledge and
cognitive resources. We found that older adults performed worse
than did younger adults on an atypical judgment task that require
inhibiting an intuitive categorization judgment. Although both
young Singaporeans and young Americans performed similarly
on this task, we observed culture effects in older adults. Older, but
not younger, Singaporeans showed the typicality effect more than
did their counterparts in the US. Moreover, we also showed that
cultural values and cognitive function interacted with each other
to influence cognition such that cultural values made a difference
for those without sufficient cognitive resources, but not for those
with sufficient cognitive resources to deal with relative cultural
disadvantages.
The first implication of the current findings is that cultural
biases not present in young adults may be revealed with age.
The task used in the present research was quite easy (mean
RT for even the old Singaporeans was less than 1.5 s and
their accuracy was over 97%). We argue that younger people
are able to overcome mild disadvantages that a culturally
incompatible task imposed, as long as cognitive loads for the
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FIGURE 3 | Mediation analyses: (A) the mediating effect of cultural values on the cultural difference and (B) the mediating effect of cognitive function on the age
difference, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗p ≤ 0.05 and +p = 0.07.
task are low. In line with this reasoning, present work found
that the cultural difference in the task was negligible among
younger participants, whereas it became evident among older
participants. As such, present work suggests that various factors
(e.g., age, cognitive function, cultural knowledge, and task
difficulty) should be taken into account to fully understand
the interplay between age and culture. Systematic investigation
of these issues would be a worthy endeavor for future
work.
Another implication of the current work is suggesting that
different processes may be responsible for aging and for cultural
effects on cognition. A series of regression analyses showed that
aging effects are closely linked to age related declines in cognitive
function whereas cultural influences are highly associated with
one’s endorsement of their culture. Firstly, across the two cultures,
the age differences in the atypicality cost disappeared when
controlling for cognitive function, suggesting that age-related
declines in cognitive function may mediate the corresponding
age-differences in the atypicality cost. Second, our data also
showed that cultural differences between older Singaporean
and American participants disappeared when controlling for
cultural values, suggesting that cultural values may mediate
cultural differences in the atypical cost. More importantly, we
provided empirical evidence showing that cultural values and
cognitive function jointly influence our cognition. Specifically,
the moderated mediation showed that East Asian values (i.e.,
conservation) mediated a cost of East Asian reasoning (i.e.,
atypicality cost) only when one did not have enough cognitive
resources to overcome cultural disadvantages. Then, this finding
shows how cognitive function and culture interact with each
other to determine our cognitive processes.
Before closing, several cautionary notes seem warranted. First,
there was an age × culture interaction effect on education years
that closely resembled the key interaction effect we found in
the atypicality effect. Namely, old American participants were
more educated than old Singaporean participants. This may be
problematic as education is closely associated with cognitive
performance. However, our old Singaporeans received more
education, compared to old Singaporeans in other similar studies
(e.g., Chee et al., 2009). Also, in spite of less education, old
Singaporeans did not significantly differ from old Americans in
terms of basic cognitive functions such as processing speed or
working memory. Moreover, the key interaction between age
and culture remained significant after controlling for education
years. Similarly, it may be problematic to use English materials
for Singaporeans although both young and old participants
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in the present research were fluent in English. Thus, these
issues regarding education years and native language should
be further addressed in future work. Second, although atypical
trials constitute the critical condition of the present work, its
number may be not enough to test the key interaction. However,
variations among atypical trials were comparable to those among
typical trials that had enough number of trials, as indicated
in the error bars of Figure 1. This suggests that the small
number of atypical trials might not be a serious issue in the
present research. Third, the present work focused on age-related
cognitive decline and yet, wise reasoning has been show to
improve into old age presumably because of life experiences
(Grossmann et al., 2010). Thus, it would be a worthy endeavor
for future research to investigate how culture may interact with
age-related improvement in reasoning, as shown in a recent
study (Grossmann et al., 2012). Finally, the present research is
cross-sectional and thus, it is difficult to rule out other potential
generations effects. Thus, this issue should be clarified in future
work with a longitudinal design.
To conclude, the results clearly demonstrated the joint effect of
biological processing (aging) and sustained experiences (culture)
on cognition. As Park and Gutchess (2002) proposed, the
Age × Culture interaction can provide a unique opportunity
to examine how biological and experiential factors may come
together to act on our reasoning, since aging influences in
cognition rely mostly on biological factors and cultural influences
rely largely on experiential factors. Therefore, the age × culture
interaction is an important domain for systematic investigation
and an effort to understand the impact of neurobiology and
situated context on cognition. We hope that the present work
adds to the emerging literature on such investigations (Kitayama
et al., 2013, unpublished).
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APPENDIX
Words used in the category judgment task.
Animate living objects: baby, banker, bear, beaver, blacksmith, camel, clown, cook, crow, doe, dove, duchess, geese, horse, lawyer,
miner, mosquito, moth, mule, nun, pup, queen, robber, toad, uncle, walrus
Inanimate living objects: flower, elm, dandelion, plant, seaweed, shrug
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